Recent Work in the Epistemology of Understanding

The philosophical interest in the nature, value, and varieties of human understanding has swelled in recent years. This article will provide an overview of new research in the epistemology of understanding, with a particular focus on the following questions: What is understanding and why should we care about it? Is understanding reducible to knowledge? Does it require truth, belief, or justification? Can there be lucky understanding? Does it require ‘grasping’ or some kind of ‘know-how’? This cluster of questions has largely set the research agenda for the study of understanding in epistemology. This article will conclude by discussing some varieties of understanding and highlight directions for future research

What's the Point of Understanding?

What is human understanding and why should we care about it? I propose a method of philosophical investigation called ‘function-first epistemology’ and use this method to investigate the nature and value of understanding-why. I argue that the concept of understanding-why serves the practical function of identifying good explainers, which is an important role in the general economy of our concepts. This hypothesis sheds light on a variety of issues in the epistemology of understanding including the role of explanation, the relationship between understanding-why and knowledge, and the value of understanding-why. I conclude that understanding-why is valuable and yet knowledge plays more important roles in our epistemic life

Intellectual Humility and the Curse of Knowledge

This chapter explores an unappreciated psychological dimension of intellectual humility. In particular, I argue there is a plausible connection between intellectual humility and epistemic egocentrism. Epistemic egocentrism is a well-known cognitive bias – often called ‘the curse of knowledge’ – whereby an agent attributes his or her own mental states to other people. I hypothesize that an individual who exhibits this bias is more likely to possess a variety of traits that are characteristic of intellectual humility. This is surprising because intellectual humility is often regarded as an antidote to cognitive biases, whereas I claim that a particular cognitive bias (namely, the curse of knowledge) may help foster an intellectual virtue

Skepticism, Fallibilism, and Rational Evaluation

This paper outlines a new type of skepticism that is both compatible with fallibilism and supported by work in psychology. In particular, I will argue that we often cannot properly trust our ability to rationally evaluate reasons, arguments, and evidence (a fundamental knowledge-seeking faculty). We humans are just too cognitively impaired to achieve even fallible knowledge, at least for many beliefs

Assertion, action, and context

A common objection to both contextualism and relativism about knowledge ascriptions is that they threaten knowledge norms of assertion and action. Consequently, if there is good reason to accept knowledge norms of assertion or action, there is good reason to reject both contextualism and relativism. In this paper we argue that neither contextualism nor relativism threaten knowledge norms of assertion or action

Disagreement or Badmouthing? The Role of Expressive Discourse in Politics

A striking feature of political discourse is how prone we are to disagree. Political opponents will even give different answers to factual questions, which suggests that opposing parties cannot agree on facts any more than they can on values. This impression is widespread and supported by survey data. I will argue, however, that the extent and depth of political disagreement is largely overstated. Many political disagreements are merely illusory. This claim has several important upshots. I will explore the implications of this idea for theories about voter misinformation, motivated reasoning, public reason liberalism, deliberative democracy, and a number of other issues

An Analysis of Freedom and Rational Egoism in Notes From Underground

In trying to decide between Nikolay Chernyshevsky’s rational egoism and Fyodor Dostoevsky’s expressivism, the author confronts a huge overarching question: What does it mean to be human? The discussion looks at Dostoevsky’s Underground Man, who believes that a rational utopia leaves humans without their most prized advantage: free will. The author determines that Dostoevsky’s notion of freedom is designed to negate Chernyshevsky’s, but to what extent must the Underground Man exist in a society organized so rationally? If the Underground Man need not be a product of society, then what can be the value of the unpleasant experience the Underground Man seems to offer as the alternative to rational egoism? Ultimately, since the two philosophers offer incompatible conceptions of freedom, we cannot definitely decide which to prefer. But, the author asserts, Dostoevsky still fails to justify satisfactorily his conception of human nature

A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of Appeals

Some legal researchers may assume that all cases decided by federal courts are published. However, many United States courts of appeals’ decisions go unpublished. United States courts of appeals’ decisions are important sources of law since they are the court of last resort for most litigants. By making a survey of Westlaw and LEXIS, the author sheds light on some aspects of unpublished opinions

A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of Appeals

Some legal researchers may assume that all cases decided by federal courts are published. However, many United States courts of appeals’ decisions go unpublished. United States courts of appeals’ decisions are important sources of law since they are the court of last resort for most litigants. By making a survey of Westlaw and LEXIS, the author sheds light on some aspects of unpublished opinions

Antimicrobial activity of an iron triple helicate

The prevalence of antibiotic resistance has resulted in the need for new approaches to be developed to combat previously easily treatable infections. Here we investigated the potential of the synthetic metallomolecules [Fe2L3]4+ and [Cu2(L’)2]2+ as antibacterial agents. Both molecules have been shown to bind DNA; [Fe2L3]4+ binds in the major groove and causes DNA coiling, whilst [Cu2(L’)2]2+ can act as an artificial nuclease. The work described here shows that only [Fe2L3]4+ is bactericidal for Bacillus subtilis and Escherichia coli. We demonstrate that [Fe2L3]4+ binds bacterial DNA in vivo and, strikingly, that it kills B. subtilis cells very rapidly